The schedule presents an outline. Click to see the complete abstracts.

Opening Reception and Light Dinner

Breakfast

Introduction and Opening Remarks

• Dean Lauren Robel
  Dean and Val Nolan Professor of Law
  Indiana University Maurer School of Law
• Provost Karen Hanson
  Provost and Executive Vice-President
  Rudy Professor of Philosophy
  Indiana University

Panel I: Constitutional Design

• David C. Williams
  Panel Chair
• Prof. Larry Diamond
  Discussant
• Dr. M. Nadir Atash
• Prof. Nazif Shahrani
  (Afghanistan)

  Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Constitution: ÒMost EnlightenedÓ but Inappropriate?

  As a multiethnic post-colonial buffer nation-state, Afghanistan was ruled over by autocratic centralizing monarchic regimes for nearly a century following its creation in late 19th century. Extant ethnic and tribal differences gradually transformed into articulated forms of social fragmentation due to discriminatory nationalizing policies of the failing state leading to Khlaq-Parcham Communist revolution, Soviet occupation, Jihadi resistance, and proxy wars culminating to the rise of Taliban and Talibanism in mid-1990. After defeat of the Taliban regime, the most crucial challenge facing Afghan leadership and their international patrons was stabilizing a seriously divided Afghan society following three decades of conflict and violence, much of it within the country. One of the most promising means for responding to this important challenge was the opportunity for designing/formulating an appropriate constitutional framework for post-Taliban Afghanistan as it was mandated by the Bonn Accords of December 2001. Upon ratification by acclamation (not a vote of the Constitutional Assembly of 502 delegates) Afghanistan's new Constitution was promulgated by Hamid Karzai on December 5, 2004, and it was immediately lauded by its framers and international sponsors as Òthe most enlightened in the Islamic worldÓ, a Òmilestone along the political processÓ, and deemed an essential part of establishing Afghanistan's political future as a stable democracy in this troubled part of the world. Much to the disappointment of the peoples of Afghanistan and growing concern of the international community who closely supervised and supported the Constitution-making processes, five years later the post-Taliban Constitution has produced a kleptocracy fueling a powerful resurgence of the Taliban. This paper, while taking note of what may be ÒenlightenedÓ about this Constitution, will question the appropriateness of the charter in light of Afghanistan's troubled history and political culture. The role of Afghanistan's various post-Taliban ruling elites and those of their national and international supporters in crafting this inappropriate Constitution--filled with ÒintegrationistÓ and ÒaccommodationistÓ tensions--to address the conflicting needs of seriously divided national and international constituencies will be also addressed.

• Amb. Feisal Amin Rasoul al-Istrabadi
  (Iraq)

  Re-Thinking Iraq: A Gedankenexperiment in Constitutional Politics

  In the wake of the 1991 war in Iraq, the international community established a northern safe haven to protect Iraq's Kurdish population. Two de facto independent Kurdish statelets ultimately emerged, one ruled from Erbil, the other from Suleimania. Contact between Baghdad and these statelets was reduced to virtual non-existence until 2003. Post-2003, the new political elites made a fundamental bargain: The Kurds would agree to be re-integrated into the State on the condition that such re-integration would be achieved through a federative constitutional order. Yet the constitutional arrangement actually constructed in the 2006 Constitution maintains de facto Kurdish independence at the expense of the re-establishment of a stable and coherent national government in Baghdad. Indeed, the Kurdish leadership has made its continued desire for independence clear through its repeated assertions of the right formally to secede from Iraq. It thus appears that the Kurdish strategy for the post-2006 constitutional period is to create a placeholder, in the expectation that a moment propitious for the de iure declaration of independence will eventually arise. So long as that is the Kurdish strategy, no coherent Iraqi government can emerge, and Baghdad will continue neither to be capable of protecting its national interests internationally, nor of asserting its authority domestically. This paper, whilst not advocating de iure Kurdish secession, argues that the failure to recognize that the Kurds have not-and apparently will not-accede to a constitutional order which actually re-integrates them into Iraq may irretrievably damage the ability to restore a coherent government in Baghdad. It makes a preliminary examination of several issues which arise from Kurdish secessionalist policies, such as post-independence allocation of resources (oil, water) and sovereign debt (UNCC, reparations to Iran and Kuwait).

• Dr. Reidar Visser
  (Iraq)

  From Sharifian Officers to Bremerian Councillors: The Role of Internal and External Forces in Shaping Iraq's Consociational and Federal Democracy

  This paper focuses on how internal and external forces shaped the system of government in Iraq in the post-2003 period, with particular emphasis on the introduction of federalism and consociational democracy in two key charters - the transitional administrative law of 2004 and the constitution of 2005. Before 2003, the question of decentralisation in Iraq first and foremost related to the Kurdish issue, and there was never any question about expressing sectarian identity in the rest of Iraq through territorial havens (or in fact through any explicit sectarian quota distribution formula at all). Despite this unambiguous historical legacy - which effectively goes back to the Ottoman period - Iraq emerged from the 2003 invasion with a completely new system of government in which the principle of federalism was applied to the entire country, and where the enshrinement of sectarian identity was made possible and indeed encouraged both at the level of administrative geography (through the possibility for creating sectarian regions) as well as at the level of the central government (through thinly-disguised sectarian quota arrangements, such as the tripartite presidency with veto powers). The main argument in the paper is that this system emerged as an interplay between foreign ÒexpertsÓ who had little knowledge about Iraq and a group of Iraqis who were more concerned with their own narrow party interests than those of the nation as a whole. This latter group of Iraqis was brought together from different backgrounds first and foremost on the basis of a common interest in winning power, and with the formative experience of the first governing council of 2003 pulling them together - hence the analogy between the ÒBremerian councillorsÓ of 2003-2004 and the ÒSharifian officersÓ who rose to power in mandatory Iraq on the basis of their common experience as anti-Ottoman rebels in the First World War.

Beverage Break

Panel II: Electoral Systems

• Prof. Susan Williams
  Panel Chair/Discussant
• Prof. Thomas H. Johnson
  (Afghanistan)
• Prof. William Maley
  (Afghanistan)
• Prof. Adeed Dawisha
  (Iraq)

  Electoral System Choice and the Post-2003 Elections in Iraq I

  The paper traces the historical process by which the closed Party List Proportional Representation (PLPR), with the whole country as one constituency, was adopted for the January 2005 transitional elections from a number of other viable options, and the reasons for modifying the system by introducing province-based constituencies for the December 2005 general elections. The paper then details the electoral process and results of the two elections, pointing to the primacy of ethno-sectarian preferences, that in turn contributed to the ensuing bloody sectarian conflicts, and the resultant weakness of the state in relation to sub-state groups and militias. The largely successful assault by the state in the Spring of 2008 against the Mahdi army facilitated an environment in which parties and groups adopting a national, rather than sectarian, discourse emerged as victors in the provincial elections of January 2009, thus undermining some established parties and their leaderships. The latter was further weakened by the introduction of an 'open' PLPR system. The paper concludes by considering future options for electoral system design in Iraq and how the electoral system and the emerging patterns of electoral alignment may affect the prospects for the development and stabilization of democracy in Iraq.

• Prof. Larry Diamond
  (Iraq)

  Electoral System Choice and the Post-2003 Elections in Iraq II

Lunch

Panel III: Economic Recovery

• Prof. Sumit Ganguly
  Panel Chair/Discussant
• Mr. Peter Marsden

  Opportunities and Limitations of Intervention-Led Programs to Rebuild and Improve the Afghan Economy

  It is possible to identify three distinct phases, since the Second World War, during which Afghanistan has received external assistance to help strengthen its economy. The first of these was over the 1950-1992 period when the Soviet Union was the major investor even though the US and other donors also contributed to the economy. The USSR made tangible and sustainable improvements to the infrastructure up until 1978 but these were largely destroyed during the eleven years of conflict that followed. The second phase was the period from 1992-2001 when it was left to the UN, ICRC and NGOs to ensure that the population benefited from basic services, in the absence of governments with the capacity to do so. The third phase has been the period since the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, in which the US has been the major donor but other governments have made varying contributions to the development process, some very significant. While the US and other donors have been able to demonstrate some progress in relation to improvements in the major highway system, these and other development projects have suffered from insurgent attacks and it has proved increasingly difficult for the UN, ICRC and NGOs to deliver basic health, education, agricultural support and other programmes. Further, the high level of insecurity, in combination with bureaucratic obstacles, has deterred all but a few major investors. Efforts to reform the public administration have met with only limited success. Economic growth has disproportionately benefited a small elite, leaving the majority of the population in a situation of chronic poverty. In spite of eight years' external investment, Afghanistan rests in the 181st position out of the 182 countries listed in the UNDP Human Development Index for 2009.

• Dr. Andrew Wilder

  Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Effectiveness of Development Aid as a 'Weapons System'

  There is a widely held assumption in military and foreign policy circles that development aid is an important Òsoft powerÓ tool to promote stabilization and security objectives in fragile states. Counterinsurgency doctrine in particular emphasizes the importance of reconstruction and development assistance in promoting stabilization by Òwinning hearts and mindsÓ of civilian populations.

  This assumption is reflected in the common assertion that Òsecurity and development are two sides of the same coin,Ó and by statements, such as that made by the former head of Coalition forces in Afghanistan (now the US Ambassador in Kabul), that Òwhere the road ends the Taliban begins.Ó This assumption's centrality to US counterinsurgency doctrine is illustrated by the US Army's 2009 publication, ÒThe Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System.Ó

  The belief that aid wins hearts and minds and promotes stability is having a major policy impact, including the allocation of much greater levels of US government funding for the development sector. Another policy impact has been that an increasing percentage of US development aid is being programmed to promote security rather than more traditional humanitarian and development objectives. It has also resulted in a much higher percentage of US development aid being channeled through the military rather than more traditional aid actors.

  Given how widespread the assumption is, and given its major impact on aid and counterinsurgency policies, there is to date little empirical evidence that supports the conventional wisdom that development aid Òwins hearts and mindsÓ and contributes to improved stabilization and security. While considerable time, effort and resources have been devoted to assessing the effectiveness of aid in achieving humanitarian and development objectives, surprisingly few resources have been devoted to assessing the effectiveness of aid in achieving stabilization and security objectives. This paper is intended to help address this gap by presenting some preliminary findings from a year of field research in five provinces of Afghanistan.

• Prof. Christopher Coyne
  (Iraq)

  An Economic Analysis of the Economic Reconstruction of Iraq

  This paper provides an economic analysis of the economic reconstruction of Iraq following the 2003, U.S-led invasion. Economics sheds light on the incentives and constraints involved in the various aspects of economic reconstruction. These incentives and constraints result in 'reconstruction traps,' which can hamper efforts to rebuild post-conflict economies. This paper identifies four reconstruction traps and illuminates the dynamics at work by drawing on the Iraq reconstruction experience. These traps include: (1) the credible commitment trap, (2) the political economy trap, (3) the bureaucracy trap, and (4) the fatal conceit trap.

Refreshment Break

Dinner

Breakfast

Panel IV: Conflict Resolution

• Prof. Christiana Ochoa
  Panel Chair
• Prof. Timothy Waters
  Discussant
• Prof. Amin Saikal
  (Afghanistan)
• Prof. Abdulkader Sinno
  (Afghanistan)

  Why NATO Is Likely to Fail in Afghanistan

  Abdulkader Sinno analyzes the dynamics of the current conflict in Afghanistan by applying the organizational approach he developed in Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Cornell University Press, 2008) and concludes that NATO and the US are unlikely to defeat the Taliban and to establish a stable allied state in Afghanistan. He proposes a strategy that involves an agreement with the Taliban. This complex strategy could accomplish some NATO goals and avert a clear defeat.

• Prof. Eric Davis
  (Iraq)

  Lessons Learned from Iraq: Implications for Theory, Analysis and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East

Beverage Break

Panel V: Policy Recommendations

• Prof. Brian Shoup
  Panel Chair
• Prof. Jeffrey Isaac
  Discussant
• Dr. Sima Samar
  (Afghanistan)

  State-Building in Afghanistan

• Prof. Nathan Brown
  (Iraq)

  The Primacy of Politics and the Irrelevance of America: Reflections on the Iraq Constitutional Experience

  After a prolonged period of hesitation following its March 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, the United States placed constitution writing at the center of its program of political reconstruction for the country. On 13 July 2003, Paul Bremer, the administrator of the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority, announced that the coalition's job would be done when a constitution was written and approved in a referendum. Having announced this benchmark, however, the US proceeded more or less by trial and error, discovering many political obstacles only as they became undeniable and developing a process for constitution drafting and approval by improvisation, reaction, and, on all too rare occasion, political ingenuity.

  The United States was not operating completely in the dark, of course. To their credit, on occasions when US policy was revealed to be a lemon, US officials showed an ability to make lemonade: they resisted elections, for instance, and worked hard to stave them off until they became inevitable-and then promptly embraced them as a central element of their policy and trumpeted them as a vindication of their approach.

  US decision makers were guided not only by a spirit of improvisation. When it came to issues of constitution drafting and design, they had their own constitutional tradition on which to draw, of course-one of the longest, richest, and most intellectually impressive constitutional traditions in the world today. The US understanding of its own history informed and colored the country's approach to Iraq, especially in the earlier phases of the occupation. The American self-understanding was even more influential among stateside observers, experts and the general commentariat.

  But in the end, that turned out to be a problem. Not only was the US tradition of limited relevance, but American officials (and, even more, American commentators who began to follow the process with considerable enthusiasm beginning in the summer of 2005 as the ÒpermanentÓ Iraqi constitution was drafted) tended to rely not on a realistic appreciation of the nature of their own country's historical experience with constitution drafting, implementation, and evolution, but instead with an almost hagiographical approach to their constitution's drafters and an antiseptic understanding of its evolution, stripped down to those elements that seemed better designed to instill civic pride in an adolescent than sophistication in an adult facing a daunting (and, as will be seen, almost impossible) political challenge in a very foreign land.

Lunch